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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
On May 10, 2000, appellee, the County of Morris, New 
Jersey ("the County"), brought this declaratory judgment 
action in state court to establish the constitutionality of its 
policies regulating the private use of county facilities in the 
face of threatened litigation by the Nationalist Movement, a 
Mississippi-based private non-profit organization that 
sought to hold (and, in the event, did hold) a parade and 
rally in Morristown, the county seat, on July 4, 2000. After 
the case was removed to federal court, the District Court 
determined that the steps and lawn of the Morris County 
Courthouse were not a public forum and, thus, the County 
could reasonably preclude the Nationalist Movement from 
using the courthouse steps for their rally. Additionally, the 
District Court held that some portions of the County's 
policies did, and some did not, pass constitutional muster. 
On appeal, the Nationalist Movement contends that the 
District Court erred when it decided that the Nationalist 
Movement did not have a First Amendment right to 
demonstrate on the steps and lawn of the courthouse. The 
Nationalist Movement also contests the District Court's 
decision to deny its application for attorney's fees. 
 
We conclude that events which occurred subsequent to 
the contested orders render this appeal moot as to the 
Nationalist Movement's claim of right to use the courthouse 





The scenario giving rise to the present action began with 
a request by the Nationalist Movement for permission to 
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hold a parade and rally in Morristown on July 4, 2000. 
From the correspondence between the Nationalist 
Movement and the County that followed, areas of 
 
disagreement became apparent as to the exact location of 
the planned event and the parties' respective financial 
responsibility for costs related to the demonstration. 
 
In a letter dated March 21, 2000, Richard Barrett, as 
First Officer of the Nationalist Movement, informed the 
Morris County Board of Freeholders that the group 
intended to hold an "Independence from Affirmative-Action 
Day" parade and rally in Morristown on July 4. The letter 
stated that the purpose of the event was to "celebrate the 
Fourth of July, call for abolition of Affirmative-Action and 
voice support for former State Police Chief, Carl Williams." 
As envisioned by the Nationalist Movement, the parade 
would take place on a public street and culminate in a rally 
on the steps and lawn of the County Courthouse. 
Specifically, the Nationalist Movement requested the 
following accommodations: 
 
       Kindly reserve area from 9:00 AM (at which time 
       decorating will take place, followed by assembly at the 
       Green for paraders at 11:00 AM) until 4:00 PM. The 
       parade will step off at Noon from the Green, proceed to 
       and around the Courthouse. The rally -- including 
       ceremonies, petitions and speeches -- will begin at 
       12:30 PM at the Courthouse steps at Washington 
       Street and last until approximately 3:00 PM, followed 
       by disassembly of the equipment and signing of 
       petitions. The event will be open to the pro-majority 
       public, who we decide to admit. 
 
Further, Mr. Barrett's letter stated that the Nationalist 
Movement expected approximately 50 paraders and 100 
spectators, requested adequate security to deal with 
anticipated violent counter-demonstrators, and sought 
assurance that it would have access to an electrical outlet, 
restroom facilities, and parking. 
 
In a letter dated April 26, 2000, the County 
Administrator, James J. Rosenberg, sent Mr. Barrett a copy 
of the then-Policy and Procedure Guidelines No. 4:1.01 
("policy 4:1.01"), which governed the use of public facilities, 
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together with related forms for completion. County 
Administrator Rosenberg added: 
 
       In view of the potential damages, that you have 
       brought to my attention, which may occur during your 
       anticipated rally on County property here in 
       Morristown, you will be required to provide insurance 
       in the amount of $3,000,000 for liability insurance for 
       bodily injury and $5,000,000 aggregate for property 
       damage liability. Said insurance shall conform and 
       comply with all aspects of Section IV, Insurance 
       Requirements of the above stated Policy and Procedure. 
 
The County Administrator also stated that, because July 
4 was a holiday, the courthouse would be closed and 
that -- due to a concern regarding the volume of holiday 
traffic -- Washington Street (the street at the front of the 
courthouse) would not be closed. As an alternative to the 
Nationalist Movement's proposed plans, the County 
Administrator suggested that the Nationalist Movement 
assemble at the rear of the courthouse on the Ann Street 
Parking Deck. Moreover, the letter provided that: 
 
       All parades, assemblies, rallies, and the like must 
       assume the responsibility and pay for the costs of 
       additional police, fire and public works support above 
       the normal daily levels of staffing. Additional support 
       agreed to prior to the event shall be used as a guide. 
       However, costs assessed to the event will be actual, 
       based on the number of personnel required and 
       utilized. 
 
Mr. Barrett, on behalf of the Nationalist Movement, 
responded with a May 4, 2000 letter, in which he (a) 
undertook to "appeal" the County Administrator's letter to 
the Board of Freeholders, and (b) questioned the 
constitutionality of policy 4:1.01 on First Amendment 
grounds. At the same time, the Nationalist Movement 
completed and returned the application forms, noting that 
by doing so the group was not waiving its objections to the 
fee and rental provisions. Moreover, the Nationalist 
Movement indicated that it would not agree to relinquish 
use of the front of the courthouse or Washington Street and 
warned that it "intend[ed] to hold the County and any and 
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all individuals individually liable" under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
for violations of the group's First Amendment rights. 
 
The County then filed a declaratory judgment action in 
state court seeking judicial confirmation -- prior to the 
anticipated event -- of the constitutionality of the actions 
the County intended to take pursuant to policy 4:1.01. The 
Nationalist Movement removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey and filed 
a counterclaim under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985, alleging 
violation of its First Amendment rights, along with an 
application for preliminary and permanent injunctions, 
compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and 
declaratory relief. 
 
II. The District Court's Rulings 
 
After denying a motion by the County to remand the case 
to state court, the District Court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing over the course of four days and issued an oral 
opinion from the bench on June 22, 2000. The opinion 
announced orally was reflected in a written order dated 
June 27, 2000. Prior to the ruling, the parties had agreed 
to a parade route and had agreed that the Nationalist 
Movement would be allowed to admit only supporters to its 
rally. The District Court noted these areas of agreement, 
concluding: "Condensed to its essence, this case requires a 
determination of what areas involved are public forums and 
what conditions which the County would or could impose 
upon the Nationalist Movement are permissible." Finding 
ample alternative venues for the rally, the District Court 
held that the steps and lawn of the courthouse did not 
constitute a public forum either by tradition or by 
designation. Rather, the District Court found that the steps 
were "merely a means of ingress and egress" to the 
courthouse, and that the lawn was not a park but an 
"aesthetic enhancement" to the building. Thus, the District 
Court held that the County might place reasonable 
restrictions on the use of those areas if those restrictions 
did not constitute "an effort to suppress expression merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." The 
District Court concluded that previous use of the 
courthouse steps and front lawn for an annual county- 
sponsored Memorial Day observance "does not transform 
 
                                5 
 
 
that area into a public forum for other persons or entities; 
nor does the occasional, impromptu press conference or 
announcement by a political candidate from the 
Courthouse steps." The District Court stated:"This Court 
cannot and will not dictate where [the rally] will take place." 
However, the District Court suggested that the County close 
all or part of Court Street for the holiday, specifically the 
portion of Court Street abutting Washington Street near the 
front of the courthouse. 
 
The District Court also examined the County's policy 
4:1.01 which, the District Court noted, represented the sole 
written authority upon which the County relied when it 
responded to the Nationalist Movement's request. Despite a 
finding that the County's decision-making had not in fact 
been influenced by personal or institutional opposition to 
the content of the Nationalist Movement's message, the 
District Court determined that portions of policy 4:1.01 
were invalid and unenforceable. In particular, the District 
Court found (a) that the County's hold-harmless provision 
was overly broad;1 (b) that a provision subjecting all 
applications to approval by the County Administrator 
constituted, on its face, "a totally discretionary realm for 
the County Administrator, with no expressed standards and 
one, frankly, which at least has a potential for abuse"; and 
(c) that a provision allowing the County to charge a fee for 
the use of its facilities without providing any schedule of 
fees, a cap, or provisions for waivers amounted to"the very 
type of indefinite, imprecise and potentially arbitrary 
provision which the Forsyth County decision[Forsyth 
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)] 
determined to be unconstitutional." Likewise, the District 
Court found the insurance provision to be unenforceable. 
Additionally, the District Court determined that it was 
unreasonable for the County to assess against the 
Nationalist Movement the anticipated costs of police, fire, 
and other emergency services. Finally, the District Court 
denied the Nationalist Movement's S 1983 counterclaim as 
premature based on the finding that the County -- which 
had filed its declaratory judgment action to ensure that it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court encouraged the parties to negotiate a more limited 
hold-harmless provision. 
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conformed its behavior to the requirements of the First 
Amendment -- had not yet violated any of the Nationalist 
Movement's constitutional rights. Thus, the District Court 
concluded that the Nationalist Movement was not a 
prevailing party under its counterclaim but did not rule out 
an award of attorney's fees with respect to the County's 
declaratory judgment action. 
 
On July 4, 2000, the Nationalist Movement held its 
parade and rally in Morristown. Although the record does 
not contain a full description of the event, it appears that 
members of the Nationalist Movement marched on 
Washington Street in the vicinity of the County Courthouse 
but did not enter onto the courthouse lawn or conduct their 
rally from the courthouse steps.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. By letter to Ronald Kevitz, Morris County Counsel, dated July 21, 
2000, the Nationalist Movement requested permission to use the front 
steps and lawn of the Morris County Courthouse during an 
Independence Day parade and rally to be held on July 4, 2001. 
Approximately six months later, on December 12, 2000, the County 
revised policy 4:1.01, perhaps in an effort to remove those elements that 
had been held unconstitutional by the District Court in its June 22, 
2000 bench opinion. Revisions, some minor and some more substantial, 
were made to a number of provisions, including those dealing with the 
application procedures, the level of discretion vested in the County 
Administrator, the fee provision, and the insurance requirements. 
 
In a June 23, 2001 letter, the Nationalist Movement informed this 
court that it had information that the County had changed its policy 
regarding use of the courthouse steps and lawn. The County responded 
on June 28, 2001 by submitting a certified copy of the minutes of the 
June 19, 2001 meeting of the County Board, which included the 
following statement: "The safety of all parties is of paramount concern to 
the Board of Chosen Freeholders; therefore, we have decided to open the 
front lawn of the courthouse for public purpose[sic]. This decision was 
based on further consideration and deliberation of last year's experience, 
and input from law enforcement." In the accompanying letter of June 28, 
2001, the County asserted that the change in policy was not relevant to 
this litigation. 
 
According to media reports, the Nationalist Movement -- in the person 
of Richard Barrett -- did indeed return to Morristown on July 4, 2001 for 
a second march and rally during which "Barrett spoke from the 
courthouse steps." Scott Fallon & Yung Kim, 350 Cops Guard Racist 
Speaker, The Record, July 5, 2001, at A1. 
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On June 29, 2000, the Nationalist Movement filed a 
motion for attorney's fees in the amount of $48,750.15. The 
motion was supported by an affidavit from Mr. 
Barrett -- this time as counsel for the Nationalist 
 
Movement -- in which he included a list of the hours he 
spent preparing and litigating the case along with a catalog 
of expenses related to copies, a per diem rate, an 
"allotment" for time away from his office and home, auto 
rental, airfare, and filing fees. On July 28, 2000, Mr. 
Barrett filed a supplemental affidavit in support of the 
Nationalist Movement's application for attorney's fees. 
 
On August 8, 2000, the District Court denied the 
Nationalist Movement's application for an award of 
attorney's fees for its role as defendant in the County's 
declaratory judgment action. The District Court reasoned 
that, because the Nationalist Movement could not establish 
a violation of its rights under S 1983, the provision allowing 
for a grant of attorney's fees under S 1988 was not 
triggered. Alternatively, assuming arguendo that S 1988 did 
authorize consideration of the Nationalist Movement's 
application for attorney's fees, the District Court 
determined that it was nonetheless proper to deny such an 
award. The District Court reasoned that, notwithstanding 
the Nationalist Movement's success in challenging certain 
provisions of policy 4:1.01, the Nationalist Movement did 
not prevail on the central issue of access to the courthouse 
steps and lawn, several issues were resolved by consent, 
counsel made "no effort to distinguish between time spent" 
on successful rather than on unsuccessful claims, and 
"[t]he Nationalist Movement's application for attorney's fees 
and expenses . . . is so flawed, unsupported and inflated as 
to draw into question the good faith of that submission. At 
the very least the Court could not properly quantify 
amounts allegedly due." On October 2, 2000, the District 
Court denied the Nationalist Movement's motions for 
reconsideration of the June 22, 2000 bench opinion, the 
June 27, 2000 order reflecting the June 22 opinion, and 






We first address the issue whether this declaratory 
judgment action -- brought to determine the respective 
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rights of the parties with respect to the July 4, 2000 
event -- is now moot. Article III of the Constitution provides 
that the "judicial Power shall extend to . . . Cases . . . [and] 
to Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, S 2. This grant of 
authority embodies a fundamental limitation restricting the 
federal courts to the adjudication of "actual, ongoing cases 
or controversies." Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 
186, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2001). The mootness doctrine is 
centrally concerned with the court's ability to grant effective 
relief: "If developments occur during the course of 
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in 
the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to 
grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as 
moot." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 
698-99 (3d Cir. 1996). Moreover, the requirement that an 
action involve a live case or controversy extends through all 
phases of litigation, including appellate review. See Khodara 
Envtl., Inc., 237 F.3d at 193 (citing Lewis v. Continental 
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 477 (1990)). 
 
Both parties urge this court to reach the merits. The 
Nationalist Movement contends that -- notwithstanding the 
fact that July 4, 2000 has come and gone -- this case 
survives a mootness inquiry because it is "capable of 
repetition, yet evading review." S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); DeFunis v. Odegaard , 416 U.S. 
312, 318-19 (1974). Similarly, the County contends that 
this case is not moot because the Nationalist Movement 
"apparently intends to pursue [holding an Independence 
Day rally on the courthouse steps and lawn] until such 
future time as the County agrees to it or a court orders it."3 
We are not persuaded by either variation of what is 
essentially the same argument. The exception from the 
mootness doctrine for cases that are technically moot but 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" is narrow and 
available "only in exceptional situations." City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); Weinstein v. 
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1975). This is not such a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The County also invites us to decide the mootness question according 
to New Jersey law on the ground that it initially filed its declaratory 
judgment action under state law. However, we are bound by the 
justiciability threshold established by the United States Constitution. 
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situation. The instant declaratory judgment action was 
instituted in order to resolve specific questions regarding 
what was then an upcoming parade and rally scheduled for 
July 4, 2000. The District Court conducted hearings on an 
expedited basis and rendered an opinion in time to guide 
the parties' conduct during that event. With respect to any 
dispute that might arise in connection with future 
Independence Day activities, the parties, if unable to 
resolve their differences, would have ample opportunity to 
bring a new lawsuit and to develop a record reflective of the 
particular circumstances attendant on that dispute. Thus, 
we will dismiss as moot that aspect of the Nationalist 
Movement's appeal that addresses whether the courthouse 
steps and lawn constitute a public forum.4  
 
B. Attorney's Fees 
 
We now turn to the question of attorney's fees. As a 
preliminary matter, we note that an award of attorney's fees 
with respect to the trial phases of a case is not precluded 
when a case becomes moot during the pendency of an 
appeal. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. New Jersey, 
772 F.2d 35, 41 (3d Cir. 1985); LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 
68, 75 (2d Cir. 1994). The Nationalist Movement contends 
that the District Court erred when it denied its application 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Our mootness determination is fortified by the fact that, on December 
13, 2000, the County revised portions of policy 4:1.01 which the District 
Court had held unconstitutional in its June 22, 2000 opinion. 
Additionally, on June 19, 2001, the County revised its policy with 
respect to the substantive issue appellant Nationalist Movement presses 
on this appeal -- that is, private use of the courthouse steps and lawn. 
See supra note 2. Other courts that have addressed comparable 
situations have also found mootness. See Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist 
Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1972) (determination 
of constitutionality of specific application of repealed statute is 
inappropriate); Khodara Envtl. Inc., 237 F.3d at 193 (passage of an 
amendment to federal statute mooted litigation challenging prior version 
of statute); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. 
v. 
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, evidence that 
appellant has expressed its intent to hold Independence Day events at 
the courthouse in 2002 and 2003 cannot breathe life back into the 
controversy considered by the District Court with respect to the events 
of July 4, 2000. 
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for attorney's fees in toto. Specifically, the Nationalist 
Movement asserts that its success in defending against the 
declaratory judgment action brought by the County 
established it as a prevailing party entitled to attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C. S 1988. The County argues that the 
Nationalist Movement is not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees because the County initiated this declaratory 
judgment action and, thus, no incentive was needed to 
spur the private bar to handle this case. In the alternative, 
the County adopts the District Court's argument that, 
assuming arguendo that the Nationalist Movement was a 
prevailing party, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied an award of attorney's fees on the 
grounds that (a) the issues on which the Nationalist 
Movement prevailed did not constitute the central issues in 
dispute and (b) the fee application was highly irregular and 
exaggerated. 
 
While we exercise plenary review over the legal issues 
relating to the appropriate standard under which to 
evaluate an application for attorney's fees, see Washington 
v. Philadelphia County Ct. Com. Pl., 89 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 
(3d Cir. 1996), we review the reasonableness of a district 
court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion, 
see Krueger Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. of Pa., 247 
F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2001); Washington, 89 F.3d at 1034. 
 
In this case, we are asked to review three aspects of the 
District Court's ruling on attorney's fees: (1) whether S 1988 
supports an award of attorney's fees in light of the 
dismissal of the Nationalist Movement's S 1983 
counterclaim; (2) whether the Nationalist Movement was a 
"prevailing party"; and, in the alternative, (3) whether the 
Nationalist Movement's application was so inadequate as to 
justify a complete denial. The first two questions raise legal 
issues and, thus, warrant plenary review. The remaining 
question directed at the adequacy of the fee application 
implicates both the legal standard for evaluating the 
specificity of an application (over which we exercise plenary 
review), see Washington, 89 F.3d at 1038, and the factual 
finding that certain expenses billed were excessive and 
unreasonable (which we review for clear error), id. at 1039. 
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Under the general rule, each party bears its own costs 
and attorney's fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Here, the 
Nationalist Movement relies on 42 U.S.C. S 1988(b) to 
authorize an award of attorney's fees. Section 1988(b) 
states in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to 
enforce a provision of section[ ] . . . 1983 . . . of this title 
. . . , the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 
party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 
Although the statute expressly refers to a district court's 
discretion, it is well settled that a prevailing plaintiff should 
recover an award of attorney's fees absent special 
circumstances. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
 
We first consider whether the dismissal of appellant's 
S 1983 counterclaim justified denial of an award of 
attorney's fees in this case. The District Court stated: 
 
       [A]lthough the issues tried included several which 
       implicated the "rights [of the Nationalist Movement] 
       secured by the Constitution," [quoting 42 U.S.C. 
       S 1983] there was never a "deprivation" of such rights 
       at any time through to and including July 4, 2000. To 
       reiterate, before making any decisions which could 
       have trod upon such rights, Morris County sought, 
       received and followed the rulings of a court of 
       competent jurisdiction in order that there be no 
       "deprivation" of the Nationalist Movement's rights. 
       Having failed to establish a violation of S 1983 (or any 
       other statute referred to in S 1988) the Nationalist 
       Movement is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
 
The District Court was correct in ruling that S 1988(b) 
does not provide for attorney's fees independent of a 
violation of one of the statutes enumerated in that 
provision, here S 1983. See Tunstall v. Office of Judicial 
Support of the Ct. Com. Pl., 820 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 
1987). However, we disagree with the District Court's 
conclusion that appellant did not prevail on a S 1983 claim. 
We need not revisit the dismissal of appellant's 
counterclaim in order to ascertain that the County's 
declaratory judgment action is the mirror image of aS 1983 
suit. The District Court acknowledged that the issues 
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underlying the Nationalist Movement's S 1983 counterclaim 
were identical to the issues at stake in the County's 
declaratory judgment action. Thus, to conclude that 
appellant did not prevail on any issues under S 1983 would 
grant unwarranted significance to the fact that the 
Nationalist Movement was nominally the defendant rather 
than the plaintiff in this case. See Ams. United for 
Separation of Church & State v. Sch. Dist., 835 F.2d 627, 
631 (6th Cir. 1987) (S 1988 concerned with substance, not 
form). 
 
Because the Nationalist Movement indisputably prevailed 
on significant issues in the present action to the extent that 
portions of policy 4:1.01 were held unconstitutional, we 
conclude that the Nationalist Movement is a prevailing 
party under S 1988. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. 
W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598, ___, 
121 S. Ct. 1835, 1839 (2001) (a prevailing party"is one 
who has been awarded some relief by the court"); Farrar v. 
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff who 
wins only nominal damages is a prevailing party under 
S 1988). Thus, we will remand this case to the District 
Court for further proceedings to establish the proper award 




For the reasons stated above, we (1) dismiss as moot the 
Nationalist Movement's appeal from the District Court's 
rejection of the Nationalist Movement's claim of a right to 
use the courthouse steps and lawn for a rally, and (2) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court stated that the Nationalist Movement's fee 
application was deficient because Mr. Barrett made"no effort to 
distinguish between time spent" on successful rather than on 
unsuccessful claims. It is, of course, within the District Court's 
authority 
to demand clear information upon which to base an award of attorney's 
fees. 
 
The District Court also criticized appellant's application for the 
inclusion of numerous "phantom" transportation expenses and for 
including an unsubstantiated "allotment" for time counsel spent away 
from his office to handle the present case which amounted to "more than 
40% of the total legal fees sought." There would appear to be substantial 
legitimacy in these criticisms. 
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remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion as to the 
 
Nationalist Movement's application for attorney's fees. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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